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Abstract—This paper presents a recursive computational
multi-secret sharing technique that hides k − 2 secrets of size
b each into n shares of a single secret S of size b, such that any
k of the n shares suffice to recreate the secret S as well as all
the hidden secrets. This may act as a steganographic channel
to transmit hidden information or used for authentication and
verification of shares and the secret itself. Further, such a
recursive technique may be used as a computational secret
sharing technique that has potential applications in secure and
reliable storage of information on the Web, in sensor networks
and information dispersal schemes. The presented technique,
unlike previous computational techniques, does not require the
use of any encryption key or storage of public information.
I. INTRODUCTION
An information theoretically secure k-out-of-n secret shar-
ing technique used to share a secret of size b requires a total
storage space of size b · n. Since, k − 1 shares do not reveal
any information about the secret, such techniques use k − 1
random elements of size b in order to create the shares. In this
paper, we propose that these random elements be replaced with
certain hidden information that may serve as a steganographic
channel. Note that if a secret sharing scheme uses k−1 random
elements then k−1 is the upper limit on the number of secrets
that can be hidden. We hide k−2 secrets which is near optimal.
If user A transmits a secret message to user B over a
public channel, he may divide the message into several pieces
(possibly redundant) and send the pieces on parallel channels,
such that an eavesdropper may need to compromise at least k
out of n channels to retrieve the message. B upon receiving
the pieces may reconstruct the message and authenticate it
using the signed hash of the message that A sends to B.
Transmission of this signature is an additional burden on the
network. In the proposed scheme, A may hide the signature
within the pieces of the message that is transmitted.
Information dispersal schemes for distributed storage net-
works primarily use computational secret [1], [2] sharing
schemes. In general, in a computational secret sharing scheme
an encryption key is used to encrypt the secret that is to be
securely stored/transmitted. The encrypted message is then
divided into several (possibly redundant) pieces. The key is
divided into shares using conventional secret sharing tech-
niques and these shares are stored along with the pieces of
the encrypted message, as an overhead [3], [4], [2].
In a multiparty scenario, such as in secret sharing, the hid-
den information may be used as a means of authentication of
the share (and of reconstructed secret), thus provide cheating
detection. For example, the dealer may hide a “specially”
chosen message in the shares of the secret and distribute the
hash of this message to all the players along with the shares.
The players may later reconstruct the secret and the hidden
message, find the hash of the hidden message and verify it
against the hash they have.
The presented scheme may be used as a multi-secret shar-
ing scheme that uses Shamir’s secret sharing scheme as its
building block and encodes k−2 additional secrets within the
shares of the message originally intended to be shared. And
the scheme may be used as a computational secret sharing
scheme, effectively resulting in smaller shares, by dividing a
secret into smaller pieces and then simulating a multi-secret
sharing scheme. Since the proposed algorithm generates shares
on the order of size of secrets encoded, smaller pieces will
give rise to smaller shares. Moreover, the proposed scheme
does not require any encryption key.
An efficient method for sharing multiple secrets with se-
curity based on assumption of hardness of discrete logarithm
problem is presented in [5]. Whereas [6] proposes a scheme
based on systematic block codes and [7] propose schemes
based on Shamir’s secret sharing scheme but require a large
amount of side information to be stored as public knowldege
and further [6], [7], [8] attempt to maintain ideal security.
Other schemes [9], [10] focus at improving efficiency of com-
putations involved in share creation and secret reconstruction
rather than space and transmission efficiency.
In an earlier paper [11], [12], a 2-out-of-2 (k = 2 and
n = 2) recursive scheme for secret sharing was proposed. In
this method, if k secrets are chosen such that they double in
size, then all of the smaller secrets can be recursively stored in
the shares of larger secrets, so that two shares of size 2m can
encode 2m+1 − 1 bits of information. For example, if we are
to share 3 secrets s1 = 1, s2 = 01, and s3 = 1011, then the
two shares for s1 would be Ds11 = 0 and Ds12 = 1; where
exclusive-OR operation is used for secret reconstruction. The
shares of s1 can be used to create two shares of s2 as follows:
Ds21 = Ds110 = 00 and Ds22 = 0Ds12 = 01. Here Ds110
denotes concatenation of share 1 of secret s1 with 0; and
0Ds12 denotes concatenation of 0 with share 2 of secret s1,
and so on. Similarly, we can recursively use the shares of
s2 to create the shares of s3: Ds31 = Ds2110 = 0010 and
Ds32 = 10Ds22 = 1001. As a result, the final two shares for
all the three secrets are 0010 and 1001. Consequently, using
8 bits of shares we have encoded 7 bits of secrets. This is in
comparison with conventional methods that would require a
total 14 bits of shares.
The above efficiency increase is obtained as a tradeoff
against security of the scheme. A non-recursive scheme would
require 7 bits for each share but the recursive scheme requires
4 bits per share, and a player only needs to determine 4 bits to
break the scheme. However, in practice secrets are thousands
of bits long. For example, a secret of 1048 bits length would be
encoded in approximately 1024 bits per share, and would still
require 21024 combinations to break. This may be sufficient
for many cases.
II. SPACE EFFICIENT SECRET SHARING
We propose a method to hide k−2 secrets of size b, within
the shares of a secret S of size b, using a (k, n) modified
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. The secret is divided into n
shares using modified Shamir’s secret sharing scheme such
that any k of them can be brought together for reconstruction.
Algorithm 1 (Modified Shamir’s secret sharing scheme)
1) Choose a prime p, p > max(S, n), where S is the secret.
2) Choose k − 1 random numbers y1, y2, ..., yk−1, uni-
formly and independently, from the field Zp.
3) Map these random numbers yis as y coordinates of
points: (i, yi), for all 1 ≤ yi ≤ (k − 1).
4) Map the secret S as point (0, S).
5) Using k points (i, yi), for all 1 ≤ yi ≤ (k−1) and (0, S)
interpolate a polynomial p(x) of degree k − 1 modulo
prime p.
6) Sample p(x) at n points Di = p(i), k ≤ i ≤ k + n− 1
such that the shares are given by (i,Di).
The reconstruction procedure for the secret follows the
conventional method [13].
Now consider k − 2 secrets s1s2...sk−2, si ∈ Zp for all
1 ≤ i ≤ (k − 2) or pieces of a larger message. Therefore our
task is to recursively hide si’s within the shares of secret S.
Further, we use the notation ylm to denote the y-coordinates of
points. Here the first subscript l is the index of the step in the
recursive process and subscript m is index of share to which
that y-coordinate belongs to. For example, the y-coordinate of
share 3 in the 5th recursion is written y53.
The proposed algorithm works as follows - randomly and
uniformly choose a number y11 and map it as point (1, y11).
Using (0, s1) and (1, y11) interpolate 1st degree polynomial
p1(x). Sample p1(x) at two points y21 = p1(x = 2) and
y22 = p1(x = 3). Now map the sampled points as (1, y21) and
(2, y22). Using the next piece as point (0, s2) and the newly
generated points (1, y21) and (2, y22) interpolate 2nd degree
polynomial p2(x). Evaluate p2(x) at 3 points y31 = p2(x =
3), y32 = p2(x = 4), and y33 = p2(x = 5). We then use
these 3 points as y-coordinates for x=1, 2, 3 and along with
the third piece of the message as point (0, s3) interpolate 3rd
degree polynomial p3(x). We continue this process until we
have used all the pieces and reached (0, sk−2) and interpolated
(k−2)th degree polynomial pk−2(x). We then sample pk−2(x)
at k − 1 points y(k−1)1 = pk−2(k − 1), y(k−1)2 = pk−2(k),
y(k−1)3 = pk−2(k + 1), ..., y(k−1)(k−1) = pk−2(2k − 3).
Mapping these k − 1 samples as points (1, y(k−1)1),
(2, y(k−1)2), ..., (k − 1, y(k−1)(k−1)) along with (0, S) con-
struct a (k − 1)th degree polynomial pk−1(x). We can now
sample pk−1(x) at n points such that any k points would
reconstruct the secret and the hidden information.
The process of share creation and information hiding is
formally described in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 - Dealing Phase
1) Consider k − 2 secrets si ∈ Zp, 1 ≤ i ≤ (k − 2).
2) Choose prime p = max(si, S), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 2.
3) Randomly and uniformly choose a number y11 ∈ Zp
and map it as point (1, y11).
4) Do for 1 ≤ i ≤ (k − 2)
a) Interpolate points (0, si) and (j, yij), for all 1 ≤
j ≤ i to generate a ith degree polynomial pi(x).
b) Sample the polynomial pi(x) at i + 1 points:
y(i+1)j = pi(j + i), for all 1 ≤ j ≤ (i + 1).
c) Map the i + 1 points as: (j, y(i+1)j), for all 1 ≤
j ≤ (i+ 1).
5) Interpolate points (0, S) and (j, y(k−1)j), for all 1 ≤
j ≤ (k − 1) to generate (k − 1)th degree polynomial
pk−1(x).
6) Sample pk−1(x) at n points to generate n shares:
(i, pk−1(i)), for all k ≤ i ≤ k + n− 1.
Algorithm 2 - Reconstruction Phase
1) Interpolate any k shares to generate (k − 1)th degree
polynomial pk−1(x) = S+a1x+a2x2+ ...+ak−1xk−1.
2) Evaluate S = pk−1(0).
3) Do for i = k − 2 down to 1
a) Map the coefficients of polynomial pi(x) as points:
(j, aj), for all (i + 1) ≤ j ≤ 2(i+ 1).
b) Interpolate (j, aj), for all (i + 1) ≤ j ≤ 2(i + 1),
to generate polynomial pi(x) of degree i.
c) Evaluate si = pi(0).
Security of the proposed method: Algorithm 2 works by
repetitive application of Algorithm 1. The first iteration of
the algorithm is a direct application of (2, 2) Shamir’s secret
sharing scheme. It uses a polynomial of degree 1 and generates
two shares for the first secret s1 of the message. These two
shares may be viewed as random numbers, such that given
any number r ∈ Zp, Pr(r = y21) = Pr(r = y22) = 1p .
They are then used to create a quadratic equation along with
the second secret s2 mapped at x=0 (the free term of the
equation). This quadratic equation is then sampled at 3 points
to generate 3 shares of s2. These three shares are then used as
random points to generate a 4th degree equation and encode
s3 and so on, until we have encoded all the k − 2 pieces and
generated k − 1 shares. These k − 1 shares are then used as
points along with secret S at x=0 to generate a polynomial
of degree k − 1, which can then be sampled at n points to
create the final shares. These final shares have the shares of
the smaller pieces hidden within them. The security of the
protocol is predicated upon the random and uniform choice of
the first coefficient y11.
Example. Suppose we want to hide 3 secrets s1 = 46, s2 =
69, and s3 = 72 within the shares of a secret S=65. Let
k = 5 and n = 7, i.e. we are to create 7 pieces such that 5 of
them must come together to recreate the secret and the hidden
message. We execute the algorithm as follows,
1) Choose a prime p = 131.
2) Randomly and uniformly choose a number y11 ∈ Z131,
say y11 = 102. Map it as point (1, 102).
3) Interpolate (0, s1) = (0, 46) and (1, 102) to generate
p1(x) = 56x+ 46.
4) Sample p1(x) at two points x = 2, 3: y21 = p1(2) = 27
and y22 = p1(3) = 83.
5) Map these new points as (1, y21) = (1, 27) and
(2, y22) = (2, 83).
6) Interpolate (0, s2) = (0, 69), (1, 27) and (2, 83) to
generate p2(x) = 49x2 + 40x+ 69.
7) Sample p2(x) at three points x = 3, 4, 5: y31 = p2(3) =
106, y32 = p2(4) = 96 and y33 = p2(5) = 53.
8) Map the new points as: (1, y31) = (1, 106), (2, y32) =
(2, 96) and (3, y33) = (3, 53).
9) Interpolate (0, s3) = (0, 72), (1, 106), (2, 96) and
(3, 53) to generate p3(x) = 111x3 + 38x2 + 16x+ 72.
10) Sample p3(x) at 4 points x = 4, 5, 6, 7: y41 = p3(4) =
119, y42 = p3(5) = 43, y43 = p3(6) = 98 and y44 =
p3(7) = 33.
11) Map the new points as (1, y41) = (1, 119), (2, y42) =
(2, 43), (3, y43) = (3, 98) and (4, y44) = (4, 33).
12) Interpolate (0, S) = (0, 65), (1, 119), (2, 43), (3, 98)
and (4, 33) to generate p4(x) = 66x4+106x3+72x2+
72x+ 65.
13) Sample p4(x) at 7 points x = 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 to
create 7 shares: (5, p4(5)) = (5, 2); (6, p4(6)) = (6, 40);
(7, p4(7)) = (7, 63); (8, p4(8)) = (8, 130); (9, p4(9)) =
(9, 50); (10, p4(10)) = (10, 37) and (11, p4(11)) =
(11, 55).
Any five out of the seven shares can be interpolated to
regenerate the polynomial p4(x). This polynomial can then
be sampled to obtain S = p4(0). The y-coordinates of the
samples of p4(x) at points x = 1, 2, 3, 4 can the be mapped
as points at x = 4, 5, 6, 7 and then interpolated to reconstruct
p3(x), which can be sampled at x = 0 to obtain s3 = p3(0).
Polynomial p3(x) can be sampled at x = 1, 2, 3 to obtain y-
coordinates and map them at x = 3, 4, 5. Interpolating these
new points we obtain p2(x) and so on. The pieces of the
hidden secrets are retrieved in the reverse order.
III. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a recursive techniques to hide additional
information within the shares of Shamir’s secret sharing
schemes. This hidden information may be used for validation
of shares at the time of secret reconstruction. Further it may
be looked upon as a way to share large secrets by dividing
the secret in smaller pieces and recursively hiding them in the
shares.
Such a scheme is useful for secure transmission of infor-
mation over parallel channels. Suppose the transmitter and
receiver share secret identifications.The transmitter can then
divide the identification into pieces and recursively encode it
into the shares of the message to be sent over parallel lines.
Transmission of shares over parallel channels provided implicit
security and reliability. Further, the scheme may be used for
information dispersal in storage networks.
Future Work: It includes implementing a distributed data
storage scheme on the Web where different servers store data
by creating shares of the data using the proposed scheme. This
implicitly prevents any one (compromised) server from having
access all the user data [14]. Such an idea may be useful
in cloud computing, Chord protocol and FreeNets. Issues
regarding addressing of data shares on the network need to
be investigated.
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